Modern missiles and drones that the Russian military-industrial complex will produce in 2026 literally "from the wheels", remain critically dependent on Western dual-use microelectronics. Despite numerous sanctions packages, the Kremlin machine continues to keep its hot conveyors running thanks to extensive networks of shadow imports and gasket companies in third countries.
Anatomy of smuggling: American and European components in fresh missiles
A study of fragments of high-precision weapons (X-101 cruise missiles, ballistic Iskanders and hypersonic Zircons) manufactured in late 2025 - early 2026 demonstrates a striking pattern: more than 70% of the found electronic component base (ECB) has Western originRussian developers were never able to replace key components with analogues of their own production.
Most often, components of the following technological giants are fixed in navigation and guidance systems:
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Texas Instruments and Analog Devices (USA). Their digital-to-analog converters, transceivers, and power management chips ensure stable operation of on-board computers and radar signal processing.
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Intel (particularly its Altera division) and AMD (Xilinx). Field-programmable gate arrays (FPGAs) from these brands are the “brains” of Russian guidance systems. They are responsible for calculating complex ballistic trajectories in real time.
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STMicroelectronics (Switzerland/France) and Infineon Technologies (Germany). Their microcontrollers and power electronics control the servos of the wings and rudders of the rockets.
Most of these chips are labeled as dual-use civilian electronics. They are used in the automotive industry, household appliances, or medical equipment, which greatly facilitates the process of acquiring them on the global market.
Shadow logistics: how chips get to Russian factories
Since direct supplies from manufacturers are blocked, Russia has developed a multi-tiered system to circumvent export controls. The chip supply chain from factory to combat missile in 2026 typically looks like this:
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Purchasing through distributors. Russian intelligence agencies purchase large batches of chips from legal distributors in Asian or Middle Eastern countries through a network of front companies.
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Transit hubs. The main hubs for re-export are companies registered in China, Hong Kong, the UAE, Turkey and Central Asian countries (Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan). Electronics are declared as components for household systems or smartphones.
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Final delivery and Angstrom. The received components are delivered to Russia, where some of them go directly to missile factories, and some to enterprises such as Zelenograd plant "Angstrem"There, imported chips are integrated into more complex on-board modules, programmed and coated with special protective compounds, trying to erase the original Western markings.
The effectiveness of Ukraine's technological blockade and countermeasures
The fact that Russia is forced to assemble the Kh-101 or Zircon missiles from chips purchased a few months ago indicates its complete lack of strategic EKB reserves. The Russian defense industry is under constant stress due to a shortage of components. Any disruption in the logistics chain causes an immediate slowdown in the missile conveyor.
In order to completely stop this flow, Ukraine, together with Western partners, will implement several strategic tracks in 2026:
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The Digital Tracking Project: analysts use the serial numbers of chips found in missiles to determine a specific primary buyer, presumably China or the UAE, after which the US or EU impose secondary sanctions on this company, completely cutting it off from the global market.
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Pressure on manufacturers: Big Tech companies are required to implement strict end-to-end control systems (Know Your Customer) to prevent the sale of large batches of FPGA matrices to dubious buyers.
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Direct destruction of infrastructure in the Russian Federation: since it is impossible to block 100% of smuggling, the Ukrainian Defense Forces, using Mid and Deep Strike means, are pinpointing the nodes where these chips are converted into weapons, which are Russian design bureaus, assembly plants, and microelectronics enterprises.
HiTech Expert Take: Why is the “chip war” moving into the trenches?
Russia’s reliance on imported chips in its Kh-101 and Iskander missiles mirrors the situation with front-line FPV drones. Russian drone developers (including the VT40 team) are also using Chinese and American chips to create multi-band control receivers. The move by Ukrainian manufacturers (such as Frontline Robotics) to VIO navigation technology without GPS proves that the best response to the dominance of foreign chips by the enemy is to create more flexible and intelligent software that negates any hardware advantage of the occupiers.
Destruction of the enemy's radar umbrella with Mid Strike (such as the May defeat of 19 air defense and radar complexes) deprives the Russians of the ability to effectively use their expensive missiles. Even if the Kremlin assembly line produces another Iskander or Zircon, stuffed with Intel and Texas Instruments chips, the blinded Russian air defense system will not be able to cover its own logistics or command posts from Ukrainian AI drones in time. The technological advantage ultimately goes to those who adapt the software to the realities of the battlefield faster.
© Analytical Department HiTech Expert
